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I Comments

I

Kaplan v. Conyers: Preventing the Grocery
Store Clerk from Disclosing National
Security Secrets
Alexandra Cumings*
ABSTRACT

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA") established
procedures by which federal agencies handle personnel actions. Federal
employees who believe they were terminated or demoted without merit
may appeal the agency's action to an independent board for review. The
U.S. Supreme Court articulated, however, that when review of an action
could cause national security secrets to be divulged, a less
comprehensive review is required.
For decades, this exception to a full independent review was limited
to adverse actions that would require the reviewing board to adjudicate
the merits of a security clearance denial or revocation. Then, in August
2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit extended the
exception to adverse actions stemming from an agency's determination
that an employee is no longer eligible to occupy a national security
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University,
2015; B.A. Clemson University, 2012. I would like to thank my family for their infinite
support and without whom I would not be where I am today. I would also like to thank
my friends for their encouragement and guidance. Lastly, I would like to thank those
people who tirelessly helped me throughout this process.
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"sensitive" position. Reasoning that both security clearances and
sensitive positions pose the same national security concerns, the Federal
Circuit prohibited independent review ever the Department of Defense's
termination of two civilian employees in non-critical sensitive positions.
This Comment first discusses the purpose and procedures of the
CSRA and details the recent Federal Circuit decision. This Comment
then explores how expanding the U.S. Supreme Court's national security
exception to the CSRA disrupts congressional intent, precedent, and the
rights of millions of federal employees.
Finally, this Comment
concludes that the Congress should pass legislation that effectively
reverses the Federal Circuit's decision.
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INTRODUCTION

The nightmare of a foreign terrorist attack on U.S. soil became a
tragic reality on September 11, 2001. Since then, the government has
become justifiably concerned with protecting national security.' Now,
more than ever, many federal government positions require security
clearances and are designated as "national security sensitive."2 Although
the government's dramatic reaction to terrorism is beneficial for the
purpose of protecting national secrets, the crackdown has curtailed the
legal rights and freedoms of many Americans.3 Specifically, in the realm
of federal employment, federal courts seeking to preserve national
security have eviscerated certain congressional directives set forth in the
Civil Service Reform Act of 19784 ("CSRA").5
Congress enacted the CSRA to replace the former personnel
management system, 6 which was ineffective because a culture of
favoritism and retaliation had become endemic to the federal hiring and
firing process.7 Consequently, the CSRA, in part, provides federal
civilian employees the right to independent review by the Merit Systems

1. See, e.g., SafeguardingOur Nation's Secrets: Examining the National Security
Workforce: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Fed.
Programs and the Fed Workforce, 113th Cong. at 56:23 (2013) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Brian Prioletti, Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence), available at
http://I1.usa.gov/lpi5ypM.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014).
4. Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111
(2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
5. See Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1166.
6. The Pendleton Act of 1883 established the former personnel management
system. S. REP. No. 95-969, at 2-4 (1978).
7. Id.
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Protection Board ("MSPB") for certain personnel actions, such as
terminations and demotions. 8
However, federal courts interpreting the CSRA have found that
federal employees are not guaranteed the CSRA's procedural protections
under all circumstances. 9 In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court established a
narrow "national security" exception whereby an employee who is
terminated on the basis of an agency's decision to revoke his security
clearance is denied the statutorily granted right to MSPB review on the
merits.1 ° For more than two decades, the MSPB and U.S. Courts of
Appeals applied this exception narrowly, only allowing federal agencies
to preempt MSPB merit review of adverse employment actions related to
security clearance denials or revocations."
In August 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
dramatically changed the scope of the national security exception by
extending it to the denial or revocation of an employee's eligibility to
occupy noncritical sensitive positions. 12 Federal agencies designate a
position as "noncritical sensitive" when the nature of the position
exposes the employee to material that may potentially affect national
security.13 In the case of Kaplan v. Conyers,14 the Federal Circuit found
that a Department of Defense ("DoD") employee, in a position similar to
that of to a store clerk at a "Seven Eleven,' ' 5 could be demoted without
independent review because his job stocking shelves with sunglasses and
rehydration backpacks could lead him to infer that U.S. troops were
being deployed to a sunny region. 6
Effectively, Conyers denies hundreds of thousands of federal
civilian employees in national security positions 7 the same protections
afforded to the rest of the federal workforce.' 8 The outcome is directly at
8. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7513(d), 7701 (2012).
9. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988).
10. See id. at 529-30; see also infra Part II.C.1. (describing the Court's decision in
Egan).
11. See, e.g., Toy v. Holder, 714 F.3d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 650 (2013) (stating that "[n]o court has extended Egan beyond security clearances,
and we decline to do so").
12. Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1759 (2014).
13. Exec. Order No. 10,450, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-1953 Comp.); 5 C.F.R. §§
732.102-732.201 (2013). For a more detailed explanation of sensitive positions, see
infra Part II.A.
14. Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1759
(2014).
15. Oral Argument at 28:10, Berry v. Conyers, 692 F.3d 1223 (2012) (No. 20113207) (statement by counsel for MSPB), availableat http://1.usa.gov/luOVkf5.
16. Conyers, 733 F.3dat 1163 n.15.
17. See infra text accompanying note 23.
18. Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1166.
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odds with Congress's purpose in enacting the CSRA-eliminating
personnel decisions based on factors other than merit. 19
Because Conyers poses a real and unwarranted threat to the
integrity of the CSRA, this Comment recommends that Congress amend
the CSRA to protect federal employees who occupy noncritical sensitive
positions from unfair personnel actions-the same actions that led to the
enactment of the CSRA. Part II of this Comment will introduce the
administrative procedures for personnel actions in the federal
government and describe how the Federal Circuit's opinion in Conyers
impacts those procedures.20 Part III will argue that Conyers is contrary
to congressional intent and diverges from established precedent.2'
Finally, Part IV contends that Congress should amend the CSRA to
provide MSPB review over eligibility determinations for noncritical
sensitive positions.22
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISION

A.

Defining "Sensitive " Positions

Conyers has astounding effects for federal government employees
occupying sensitive positions. Pursuant to an executive order, agencies
must first classify jobs as "national security" positions when the
positions either relate to protecting the United States from foreign
aggressors and defending its military power or require "regular use of, or
access to, classified information., 23 Next, agencies must classify each
national security position as one of three sensitivity levels: (1) critical
sensitive, (2) noncritical sensitive, or (3) nonsensitive. 24 "Sensitive" jobs
are civilian positions in which the employee has the potential to cause a
"material adverse effect" on national security due to the nature of the
job.25 Pursuant to DoD guidelines, "noncritical sensitive" positions
comprise any position with one or more of the following attributes:
[1] Access to Secret or Confidential information.

19. See S. REP. No. 95-969, at 2-4 (1978).
20. See infra Part I.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. Exec. Order No. 10,450, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-1953 Comp.); 5 C.F.R. §
732.102 (2013).
24. Exec. Order No. 10,450, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-1953 Comp.); 5 C.F.R. §§
732.102-732.201 (noting that the positions vary in degrees of potential harm to national
security, with "critical sensitive" being the most severe). The designation determines a
position's investigative requirements. 5 C.F.R. § 732.201(b).
25. 5 C.F.R. § 732.201(a).
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[2] Security police/provost marshal-type duties involving the
enforcement of law and security duties involving the protection and
safeguarding of DoD personnel and property.
[3]Category 1I automated data processing positions.
[4] Duties involving education and orientation of DoD personnel.
[5] Duties involving the design, operation, or maintenance of
intrusion detection systems deployed to safeguard DoD personnel and
property.
[6] Any other position 26so designated by the Head of the DoD
Component or designee.
"Security clearance," by contrast, refers to an employee's access to
classified information.27 Relevant to Conyers, employees in noncritical
sensitive positions, therefore, do not always need or have access to
confidential information.2 8
B.

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978

Congress enacted the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to
streamline personnel actions 29 of civil service employees and achieve
efficiency and accountability in federal government employment.30 The
CSRA codifies the merit system principles, 3' provides impartial review
over violations of the principles, prescribes procedures for personnel
actions, protects employees from arbitrary actions, and encourages
whistleblowing. 32 The CSRA covers civil service employees 33 in all
26. DoD Reg. 5200.2-R § C3.1.2.1.2 (1987) (citations omitted).
27. See Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245, 40,246 (Aug. 7, 1995) (stating
that an agency head will grant an employee a security clearance only if the employee
needs to know classified information to perform her lawful government function and
meets certain conditions).
28. See 5 C.F.R. § 732.201(a); see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO12-800, SECURITY CLEARANCES: AGENCIES NEED CLEARLY DEFINED POLICY FOR
DETERMINING CIVILIAN POSITION REQUIREMENTS 5 (2012) [hereinafter U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE] (stating that noncritical sensitive positions are also defined as
"positions that do not have a national security element, but still require a designation of
risk for suitability purposes").
29. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (2012) (defining "personnel action[s]" as any practice
concerning employment status, such as hiring, firing, transferring, duties, performance
evaluations, modifying pay, benefits, or education).
30. S. REP. No. 95-969, at 1-3 (1978).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b). The merit system principles include maintaining efficiency;
a qualified workforce; merit-based employment; "high standards of integrity, conduct,
and concern for the public interest;" and providing equal pay, opportunities, and adequate
training free from arbitrary actions and personal or political preference and free from
whistleblower retaliation. Id.
32. S. REP. No. 95-969, at 1-2.
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federal agencies except the Government Accountability Office ("GAO")
and certain intelligence agencies.34
Congress created two agencies to implement the goals of the
CSRA.3 5 First, the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") manages
and advises federal agencies on personnel practices.36 Second, the
MSPB enforces merit system principles and adjudicates personnel
actions.37 Within the MSPB, the Office of the Special Counsel ("OSC")
investigates claims of prohibited personnel practices and reports possible
violations of the merit system principles. 38 A closer look at these
agencies will reveal how civil service employees are protected, both
procedurally and substantively.
1.

Office of Personnel Management

The OPM is an independent agency within the executive branch that
manages federal personnel practices by issuing regulations, offering
guidance, and monitoring the efficacy of agencies' personnel
procedures.39 The Director of the OPM is responsible for aiding the
President in fashioning procedures for federal employment, researching
personnel management techniques, and prescribing recommendations to
the President.40 The OPM is the "government's principal representative
in Federal labor relations matters. ' 41
Additionally, the OPM promulgates and enforces regulations
relating to civil service statutes.4 2 The Director of the OPM has the
authority to investigate the suitability of job applicants to ensure
33. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B), (C). The CSRA applies to "any position in the
competitive service, a career appointee position in the Senior Executive Service or a
position in the excepted service" and employees of executive agencies with the exclusion
of government contractors and enumerated agencies. Id. For definitions of these terms,
see id. § 3132(a).
34. Id.§ 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) (exempting, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, and "as determined by the President, any executive
agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities, provided that the determination be made
prior to a personnel action").
35. See id.§§ 1101-1105 (relating to the Office of Personnel Management); id. §§
1201-1209 (relating to the MSPB).
36. See id.§§ 1101-1105.
37. See id.
§ 1204(a).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 1212(a).
39. See id.
§§ 1101, 1104.
40. Id.§ 1103(a). The current Director is Katherine Archuleta, who began her fouryear term in November 2013.
Our People & Organization, OPM.Gov,
http://www.opm.gov/about-us/our-director/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 1101 note (Message of the President).
42. Id.§§ 1103(b)(1), 1104(b)(1).
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compliance with civil service laws and relevant regulations. 43 If the
OPM believes the MSPB erred in a decision, it may appeal the decision
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 44
2.

Merit Systems Protection Board

The second agency responsible for carrying out the CSRA is the
MSPB. 45 The MSPB is an independent and impartial three-member,
bipartisan panel 46 whose purpose is to protect the public from inefficient
and unlawful personnel practices within the government.47 The MSPB
adjudicates actions that violate the merit system principles and reviews
OPM rules and regulations.4 8 Moreover, the MSPB has the power to
issue binding orders to federal agencies and employees.49
Employees in CSRA-protected positions have the right to MSPB
review of adverse personnel actions taken against them.5 ° The CSRA
makes it unlawful for an agency to remove an employee absent "such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 5' The MSPB
generally will uphold the agency's personnel decision as long as the
decision is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.52 If parties are
dissatisfied with the MSPB's judgment, they may appeal to the Federal
Circuit, which has exclusive authority to bind the MSPB.53
a.

Office of Special Counsel

Within the MSPB, the OSC serves as the investigatory branch of the
MSPB and protects civil service employees from adverse personnel
actions, particularly whistleblower retaliation.54 The OSC "investigate[s]

43.
44.
45.

Id. § 1103(b)(1).
See id § 7703(d)(1).
See id. § 1204(a).

46. 5 U.S.C. § 1201.
47. See id. § 1204(a); S.

REP. No. 95-969, at 6 (1978).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 1204.
49. Id. § 1204(a)(2). The MSPB's subject matter jurisdiction is limited to that which
is prescribed by law, rule, or regulation. See Bennett v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 635 F.3d
1215, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
50. See 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d); see also id. § 7701 (providing employees with
Section 7532 provides an optional, alternative process
procedural safeguards).
comprising of solely internal review for employees who have claims of adverse actions
but occupy a national security position. Id. § 7532.
51. Id. § 7513(a).
52. See id. § 7701(c)(1)(B).
53. Id. § 7703(b).
54. Id. § 1212(a); see S. REP. No. 95-969, at 24 (1978) ("The Special Counsel will
also have a particular mandate to investigate and take action to prevent reprisals against
government 'whistle blowers."'). The OSC initiates investigations and responds to
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and prosecute[s] political abuses and merit system violations., 55 The
Special Counsel, head of the OSC, has adjudicative authority similar to
the MSPB. 6
Due to the sensitive nature of information surrounding
whistleblower allegations, the OSC is generally prohibited from
disclosing information connected to allegations of whistleblowing 7
However, an agency may be required to have access to all relevant
employee information to determine whether the employee should be
privy to information that, if leaked, "could be expected to cause
exceptionally grave damage to the national security." 58 In such a case,
the OSC can disclose the information surrounding the employee's
allegations of whistleblowing.59
The CSRA affords federal civilian employees procedural
protections against adverse personnel actions to promote an efficient and
accountable federal workforce.6 ° In Kaplan v. Conyers, the Federal
Circuit narrowed 6the
scope of the CSRA's protections in the context of
1
national security.
C.

The FederalCircuit's UnwarrantedExtension of the National
Security Exemption. Kaplan v. Conyers
1.

62

Precursor to Conyers: Departmentof the Navy v. Egan

In deciding Conyers, the Federal Circuit faced the essential question
of whether the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Department of the Navy
v.Egan applied.63 In Egan, the U.S. Supreme Court denied MSPB
review over the merits of security clearance denials or revocations. 64
The DoD thus argued in Conyers that the Federal Circuit should extend

individuals' non-frivolous requests to investigate prohibited personnel practices. S. REP.
No. 95-969, at 32.
55. 5 U.S.C. § 1101 note (Message of the President).
56. See id. § 1212(b)(1)-(2) (granting the OSC the authority to "administer oaths,
examine witnesses, take depositions, and receive evidence," and "issue subpoenas
...order the taking of depositions and order responses to written interrogatories").
57. See id. § 1212(g)(1) ("[E]xcept in accordance with the provisions of section 552a
of title 5, United States Code, or as required by any other applicable Federal law.").
58. Id.§ 1212(g)(2)(B).
59. See id.
60. See S. REP. No. 95-969, at 1-3 (1978).
61. Kaplan v.Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1160 (Fed.Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1759 (2014).
62. Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
63. See Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1150-51.
64. Egan, 484 U.S. at 533.
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Egan to bar MSPB review over the merits of ineligibility determinations
for "sensitive" positions.65
Egan involved Thomas M. Egan, a federal employee, who was a
laborer leader in the Navy-a civilian position within the CSRA's
protection. 66
Egan's position required "[a]ccess to [s]ecret or
[c]onfidential information" and therefore Egan required a security
clearance. 67 Because Egan was denied a security clearance, he was
fired.68 The "narrow question" before the U.S. Supreme Court was
whether the MSPB had the authority to review the merits of the Navy's
decision to revoke Egan's security clearance. 69 The answer depended on
whether the MSPB had to have the authority to review an agency's
security clearance decision to afford due process to an employee in a
national security position. 70 Answering in the negative, the Court held
that the MSPB was precluded from reviewing the merits of a security
clearance revocation under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7' 7513(d).72 The Court
reasoned that review of such a determination-whether an employee
may access classified information-is reserved solely for the employing
agency.73
The Court based its reasoning in part on the constitutional
separation of powers.74 Examining the inherent authority of the
President to control and manage access to classified information, the
Court found that the "predictive judgments" 75 associated with denying or
granting access to classified information were within the Executive's
exclusive purview.76
The Court also looked at the statutory framework for removal of a
civil service employee.77 Both parties agreed that MSPB review was
65. Conyers, 733 at 1152.
66. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 520.
67. Id. at 520-21 n.1 (quoting Chief of Naval Operations Instructions
(OPNAVINST) 5510.1F, para. 16-101-2.b (June 15, 1981)).
68. Id. at 520-21 (noting that Egan was denied a security clearance based on felony
convictions, failure to disclose criminal record, and drinking problems).
69. Id.at 519-20.
70. Id. at 526. The question quickly becomes a policy issue as to whether and to
what degree an employee should be treated differently because of her ability to cause
damage to the country by the nature of her position.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 7512 (2012).
72. Id.§ 7513(d).
73. Egan,484 U.S. at 533.
74. See id.at 527, 530-33.
75. By "predictive judgments," the Court is referring to the granting authority's
"attempt to predict [an individual's] possible future behavior and to assess whether, under
compulsion of circumstances or for other reasons, he might compromise sensitive
information." Id.at 529.
76. Id.at528-31.
77. Id. at 526, 532.
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proper, but disagreed over "the subject matter of th[e] hearing and the
extent to which the [MSPB] may exercise reviewing authority."' 8 The
Court determined that the President's "inherent authority" in areas of
national security eclipsed the MSPB's subject matter jurisdiction over
removal for "cause., 7 9 Therefore, the MSPB was precluded from
reviewing the merits of a security clearance denial and instead could only
determine:
(1) whether "cause" existed; (2) whether the security
clearance was actually denied; and (3) whether "transfer to a
nonsensitive position was feasible. 80 The Court explained that the
review provided sufficient procedural process under the circumstances of
national security concerns. 81 In Conyers, the question was whether the
limited review over security clearances that the Court prescribed in Egan
should be extended to also limit review over an employee's suitability to
occupy a noncritical sensitive position.82
2.

Background of Conyers

In Kaplan v. Conyers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit addressed two consolidated cases involving employees' appeals
from adverse personnel actions.8 3 In the first case, the employer, the
DoD, indefinitely suspended Rhonda K. Conyers ("Conyers") after she
lost her eligibility to occupy noncritical sensitive positions.8 4 The DoD
employed Conyers as an Accounting Technician-a secretarial
position-at the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. 5
Similarly, in the second case, the DoD demoted Devon Haughton
Northover ("Northover") because he was ineligible to occupy noncritical
sensitive positions.86
Prior to his demotion, Northover was a
Commissary Management Specialist (a store clerk position) at the

78. Egan, 484 U.S. at 526.
79. Id. at 529-30 (noting that executive orders have delegated such authority to
agencies).
80. Id. at 530.
81. Id. at 533.
82. Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1759 (2014).
83. Id.at 1151; see 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d) (2012) (providing employees the right to
MSPB review of adverse employment actions); id. § 7512(3) (stating that covered actions
include suspensions and demotions).
84. Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1151-52. The Washington Headquarters Services
Consolidated Adjudications Facility ("WHS/CAF"), on behalf of the DoD, performed the
security check and rendered Conyers ineligible to hold a noncritical sensitive job. Id.at
1152.
85. See Conyers v. Dep't of Def, 115 M.S.P.R. 572, 573 (M.S.P.B. 2010).
86. Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1152. WHS/CAF similarly performed the security check
and rendered Northover ineligible. Id.
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Defense Commissary Agency.87 Northover's demotion brought him to a
GS-4 grade level8 8 as a part-time Store Associate.8 9 Both Conyers and
Northover were found ineligible to occupy noncritical sensitive positions
because they held debt due to death or divorce. 90
The DoD classified both Conyers's and Northover's positions as
noncritical sensitive. 9' While the DoD did not disclose why the grocery
clerk and accounting secretary jobs were noncritical sensitive, the DoD
did state that individuals who raise security concerns are not permitted to
occupy noncritical sensitive positions because such employees may come
into contact with classified information.92 The DoD maintained this
policy even if the positions do not require access to classified
information or a security clearance, as was the case here.93
Both Conyers and Northover appealed the adverse actions to the
MSPB for independent review. 94 The Federal Circuit ultimately
dismissed Conyers's claims as moot because she received back pay and
other remedies; however, her case is still relevant for purposes of this
Comment because the decision affects similarly situated employees,
including Northover. 95

87. Id.
88. The administration of federal pay is organized in a ladder that consists of 15
levels classified in the "General Schedule" ("GS").
Pay & Leave, OPM.GOV,
http://l.usa.gov/leXc9iK (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). The OPM issues guidelines that
agencies must follow when classifying positions. Id. The "level of difficulty,
responsibility, and required qualifications" determines a position's classification. Id.
89. See Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1152. The court noted that Northover maintained a
cognizable interest in the claim, even though the DoD reinstated him, because he raised
discrimination as an affirmative defense. Id. at 1153.
90. See Joe Davidson, Senate Panel Raises Questions About 'National Security
Sensitive' Designation for Workers, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2013, available at
http://wapo.st/lx23S64.
91. See Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1151.
92. Id. at 1152.
93. See Stipulation Between the Parties in Conyers v. Dep't of Def, No. CH-752-090925-1-1 and Northover v. Dep't of Def., No. AT-0752-10-0184-I-1, (Sept. 1, 2010),
available at http://1.usa.gov/lybOrWk [hereinafter Stipulation]; Conyers v. Dep't of
Def., 115 M.S.P.R. 572, 578-79 (M.S.P.B. 2010), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Berryv.
Conyers, 692 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated,
497 F. App'x 64 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (acknowledging stipulation).
94. Conyers, 733 F.3dat 1151;see5U.S.C. § 7513(d) (2012).
95. Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1153; Supplemental Brief for the Acting Director, OPM, on
Rehearing En Banc, at 20 n.1 1, Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148 (Fed.Cir. 2013).
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3.

Procedural History:
Northover's Claims

MSPB Review of Conyers's and

At the MSPB hearing, 96 the DoD argued that because the U.S.
Supreme Court prohibited MSPB review of the merits of a security
clearance denial, the Court intended to deny MSPB review of an
employee's ineligibility to hold a sensitive position.9 7 The MSPB
rejected the DoD's argument and held that: (1) Egan was strictly limited
to prohibiting MSPB review when the "denial, revocation, or suspension
of a 'security clearance... is at issue; and (2) an agency's classification
of
98
a position as sensitive does not necessarily preclude MSPB review.
The MSPB reasoned first that reviewing a demotion and suspension
fell squarely within its jurisdiction.9 9 Second, the MSPB reasoned that
the U.S. Supreme Court intended Egan to be narrowly construed. 10 0 The
MSPB clarified that a "security clearance" and "sensitive position" are
vastly different because the former denotes access to classified
information and the latter refers broadly to national security
information. 10 1 Third, the MSPB noted that unlike Egan, where there
was a threat of classified national security information being leaked to
the MSPB, the employees in Conyers lacked access to classified
information.' 0 2 The cases were remanded to administrative judges to
review the merits of the DoD's eligibility determinations of the
employees. 103

96. Conyers, 115 M.S.P.R. at 574; Northover v. Dep't of Def., 115 M.S.P.R. 451,
453 (M.S.P.B. 2010), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Berry v. Conyers, 692 F.3d 1223
(Fed. Cir. 2012), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 497 F. App'x 64 (Fed. Cir.
2013), and rev'd and remandedsub nom. Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014).
Initially, Conyers and Northover
individually appealed the adverse personnel actions to the MSPB who passed the case
along to an administrative judge. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Kaplan v.
Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2013), petition for cert.filed sub nom. Northover v.
Archuleta, No. 13-607 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2013). The administrative judge in both cases
granted the DoD's motion for interlocutory appeal and stayed proceedings pending
determination of the certified issue. See Conyers, 115 M.S.P.R. at 573 (noting that the
administrative judge refused to extend Egan to limit review and certifying for
interlocutory review); Northover, 115 M.S.P.R. at 453 (noting that the administrative
judge applied Egan to limit MSPB review and certified for interlocutory review). The
cases were consolidated and heard before the full, three-member MSPB. Conyers, 115
M.S.P.R. at 574; Northover, 115 M.S.P.R. at 453.
97. See Conyers, 115 M.S.P.R. at 574; Northover, 115 M.S.P.R. at 458.
98. Conyers, 115 M.S.P.R. at 583-85, 587-88; Northover, 115 M.S.P.R. at 458-59.
99. Conyers, 115 M.S.P.R. at 577-78; Northover, 115 M.S.P.R. 451, 456-58.
100. Conyers, 115 M.S.P.R. at 583-85; Northover, 115 M.S.P.R. at451.
101. Conyers, 115 M.S.P.R. at 580.
102. See id. at 579; see also Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527-30 (1988).
103. Conyers, 115 M.S.P.R. at 579, 590.
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Following the MSPB's decision, the Federal Circuit granted the
OPM's petition to review10 4 on August 17, 2011.105 In a divided panel,
the Federal Circuit reversed the MSPB. 10 6 Upon rehearing en banc, the
court vacated its previous decision but again reversed the MSPB, holding
MSPB review of the employee's ineligibility for a
that Egan barred
"sensitive" job.10 7
4.

The Federal Circuit's En Banc Analysis

The majority opinion stressed three main points in support of the
conclusion that the MSPB lacked authority to review the DoD's
ineligibility determination. 10 8 First, the court reasoned that the executive
branch has broad authority in the context of national security concerns.' 0 9
The majority interpreted this authority to extend to "all prediction of risk
regarding national security."" 0 Therefore, the absence of an employee's
access to classified information was immaterial because effective
protection of national security interests requires that agencies exercise
their own judgment when determining who may hold national security
positions. 11 The majority reasoned further that such "predictive
judgments" could not reasonably be reviewed because they were
involved information that could threaten national security
subjective and
2
if revealed."
Second, the court reasoned that because Congress chose not to
enlarge the MSPB's authority in national security contexts, the executive
branch had exclusive authority. 113 Third, although Northover did not
have access to classified information, the court maintained that Egan still
applied because he could nonetheless have an adverse impact on national

104. See supra text accompanying note 44.
105. Berry v. Conyers, et al., 435 F. App'x 943, 944-45 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
106. Berry v. Conyers, 692 F.3d 1223, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh'g en bane granted,
opinion vacated, 497 F. App'x 64 (Fed. Cir. 2013), and revd and remanded sub noma.
Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014).
107. Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1759 (2014).
108. Id. at 1156-64.
109. Id. at 1155-56 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
110. Id.at1156.
111. Id.at1156-57.
112. Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1156-58, 1164 ("[D]efining the impact an individual may
have on national security is the type of predictive judgment that must be made by those
with necessary expertise.").
113. Id.at 1160, 1163 (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981)).
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security. 114 The court explained that Northover could conceivably infer
classified information 15 from the nature of his work, based on the
"compilation theory."''
The compilation theory asserts that individual bits of unclassified
information, when arranged together like puzzle pieces, may lead to the
disclosure of classified information. 1' 6 For example, Northover could
have possibly deduced that troops would be deployed in a desert region
because he was given orders to stock desert-specific supplies on the
shelves. 17 The court discussed how the modem geopolitical landscape
required national security information to be kept strictly confidential,
even if the connection to national security was merely derivative. 1 8 In
light of these considerations, the court held that an agency's internal
review procedures were sufficient to satisfy the CSRA and employees'
due process rights.1" 9
The dissent, representing three members of the court, criticized the
majority for improperly extending Egan to prohibit review over
suitability determinations.120 The dissent identified two fatal flaws in the
majority's reasoning: (1) the DoD lacks the authority to unilaterally
control access to national security information absent congressional or
presidential order; 121 and (2) the MSPB has jurisdiction to review the
DoD's adverse personnel actions pursuant to the CSRA.1 22 The dissent
also raised policy concerns by pointing out that the majority's decision is
detrimental to hundreds of thousands of federal employees and
whistleblowers.1 23 Without the authority to review the merits of an
eligibility decision, the MSPB is unable to review a sensitive employee's
allegation of whistleblower retaliation or any other affirmative
124
defense.

114. Id.("[T]here is no meaningful difference in substance between a designation that
a position is 'sensitive' and a designation that a position requires 'access to classified
information."').
115. Id.at 1163 n.15.
116. Id. at 1158.
117. Conyers, 733 F.3dat 1158.
118. Id. at 1164-65 (discussing the need to classify many positions as sensitive due to
the widened access to national security information through computers and the possibility
of intelligence gathering through blackmail and coercion).
119. Id. at 1166.
120. Id. at 1167 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
at 1168.
121. Id.
122. Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1172, 1177.
123. Id. at 1178-80.
124. See id. at 1180 n. 17 (noting that when the action is based on security clearances,
courts will not hear employees' affirmative defenses of whistleblower retaliation,
retaliation for constitutionally protected speech, retaliation for religious beliefs, or Title
VII discrimination claims).
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The dissent's distinction between Egan and the issues in Conyers
civil
properly reflects both the congressional intent to broadly protect
125
narrowly.
Egan
apply
to
precedent
the
and
service employees
III. AMENDING THE CSRA To SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF LIMITED
PROTECTIONS THAT FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES RECEIVE

Congress should amend the CSRA to reverse Conyers. Conyers
denies federal employees in sensitive positions the right to appeal an
adverse employment action even when the employee had no access to, or
need to access, classified information. 126 Congress should not allow
Conyers to restrict due process rights of employees in sensitive positions
that require neither security clearances nor access to classified
information.1 27 To effect this recommendation, Congress should amend
the CSRA to allow the MSPB to review underlying suitability
in adverse personnel actions to such abovedeterminations that result
28
described employees. 1
Notably, Congress recognizes the problematic decision in Conyers,
and bipartisan efforts have already arisen to amend the CSRA to include
the following text:
(k)(1) The [MSPB] has authority to review on the merits an appeal by
an employee or applicant for employment of an action arising from a
determination that the employee or applicant for employment is
ineligible for a sensitive position if(A) the sensitive position does not require a security clearance or
access to classified information; and
(B) such action is otherwise appealable.1

29

Congress should pass this legislation for several reasons. First,
Congress intended to grant civil service employees the right to
independent review of adverse personnel actions, and thus, Conyers's
creation of an exception to MSPB review frustrates the CSRA's
purpose. 30 Second, the Federal Circuit ignored important precedent in
deciding Conyers.' Its interpretation that Egan covers not only security
clearances but also sensitive positions is overbroad because the two
125. See id at 1167.
126. See id at 1151 (majority opinion).
127. See Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1151.
128. See, e.g., H.R. 3278, 113th Cong. (as introduced Nov. 8, 2013); S. 1809, 113th
Cong. (as introduced Dec. 12, 2013).
129. S. 1809, 113th Cong. Proposed Subsection (k) would be added to 5 U.S.C. §
7701 (2012).
130. See infra Part III.A.
131. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1988).
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designations are not synonymous.1 32 Moreover, courts have refused to
Finally, the
extend Egan beyond security clearance denials. 133
consequences of Conyers would be detrimental to hundreds of thousands
whistleblowers, who are most in need
of federal employees, specifically
34
of legislative protection. 1
A.

Conyers Createsan Exception to the CSRA That CongressDid Not
Intend

The Federal Circuit's decision to prohibit MSPB review over an
agency's determination that an employee is ineligible for a sensitive
position violates congressional intent. Through the CSRA, Congress
pledged to protect civil service employees from arbitrary personnel
actions and to "insure that employees are hired and fired solely on the
basis of their ability.' ' 135 The CSRA passed with an overwhelming
majority in both the House and Senate, with only one senator and eight
members of the House voting against its passage. 3 6 The following
reasons highlight why the outcome in Conyers directly contravenes
congressional intent.
1.

Congress Has Not Created a Sensitive Positions Exception to
the CSRA.

Congress has created specific exceptions to CSRA procedures but
has shown an unwillingness to impose a broad national security
exception, which indicates that Congress intended those employees to
remain covered. 37 In drafting the CSRA, Congress considered national
security and specifically excluded several agencies from MSPB review
138
but chose not to include the DoD or noncritical sensitive positions.
Moreover, in 1994, Congress amended the National Security Act of
1947139 to authorize the President to:
See infra Part III.B.1.
See, e.g., Toy v. Holder, 714 F.3d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
(2013).
See infra Part III.C.
S. REP. No. 95-969, at 4 (1978).
Bill Summary & Status: 95th Congress (1977-1978), S.2640, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://1.usa.gov/liWT8fw (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (stating that the CSRA
passed in the House by a vote of 365-8, and in the Senate by 87-1).
137. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2) (2012) (stating that the CSRA applies to "any
position in the competitive service, a career appointee position in the Senior Executive
Service or a position in the excepted service," and employees of executive agencies with
the exclusion of government contractors and enumerated agencies).
138. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
139. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (2012) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
132.
133.
Ct. 650
134.
135.
136.
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establish uniform minimum standards to ensure that employees in the
executive branch of Government whose access to classified
information is being denied or terminated... are appropriately
advised of the reasons for such denial or termination and are provided
an adequate opportunity to respond to all adverse information which
before final action by
forms the basis for such denial or termination
140
the department or agency concerned.
The purpose of the amendment was to provide employees "minimal
procedural protections" in relation to security clearance procedures and
thus comply with the holding in Egan, which limited MSPB review of
security clearances. 141 Agencies are therefore able to bypass the MSPB
procedures and implement their own internal review procedures. The
amendment, however, only mentions minimum procedures for the
termination of classified-status employees. 142 Congress likely intended
were still afforded the full protections
that non-classified employees
43
CSRA.1
by
guaranteed
Congress has also repealed a national security exception in the past
as overbroad, further demonstrating the congressional intent to provide
broad protection through the CSRA. 44 In 1996, Congress created a
specific exception to the CSRA by granting the Secretary of Defense the
power to remove "any employee in a defense intelligence position" when
doing so was in the interest of national security. 145 The employees'
positions in Conyers, however, were not defense intelligence positions,
and thus, the exception does not apply.146 Then, in 2005, Congress
authorized the creation of a National Security Personnel System
("NSPS") to house a personnel management system separate from the
CSRA.147 Pursuant to the NSPS, the Secretary of Defense promulgated
in national security
regulations to limit MSPB review over any employee 48
cases, not just those in defense intelligence positions. 1

140. 50 U.S.C. § 3161(a)(5) (2012) (emphasis added).
141. Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1759 (2014) (Dyk J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-753, at 54 (1994) (Conf.

Rep.)).
142. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 103-753, at 53-54 (noting that the amendment was
consistent with Egan).
143. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-753, at 53-54.
144. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 108136, § 1101, 117 Stat. 1392, 1621-33 (2003) (repealed 2009).
145. 10 U.S.C. § 1609(a) (2012); see Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1173-75 (arguing that the
presence of specific exceptions is evidence that Congress did not intend, or create, a
general national security exception to the CSRA).
146. See 10 U.S.C. § 1614.
147. See 117 Stat. at 1621-33 (repealed 2009).
148. 5 C.F.R. § 9901.107(a)(2) (repealed 2011).
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Shortly thereafter, in response to concerns regarding unfairness, 4 9
Congress invalidated the regulations and repealed the authorizing statute,
dissolving the NSPS and the separate appeals process.' 50 Specifically,
widespread criticism from DoD employees that the NSPS stripped them
of CSRA-granted protections induced Congress to invalidate the
statute.15
The limited and carefully articulated amendments to the CRSA
demonstrate a determined congressional purpose to preserve the CRSA's
broad reach. Thus, the Federal Circuit's holding should be viewed as
creating an unwarranted exception outside the scope of the legislation.
2.

Congress Intended to Foreclose Opportunities for Abuse.

In passing the CSRA, Congress sought to extend protection to all
individuals who serve their country in civil service jobs. 5 2 Specifically,
the former personnel management system had become so corrupt with
personnel decisions based on favoritism, retaliation, and self-dealing,
that Congress replaced it with a merit-based system-the CSRA.153 In
enacting the CSRA, Congress conferred broad authority on the MSPB to
achieve an efficient personnel system, which required a "strong policing
mechanism[] to assure that the greater flexibility [of agency heads] is not
abused or misused."' 5 4 The decision in Conyers, however, severely
limits the MSPB's authority by empowering agencies with the ability to
dispose of employees for any reason, as long as the dismissal is under the
guise of national security. Thus, the decision effectively turns back the
clock back to pre-CSRA troubles.
3.

Conyers Exacerbates Problems That Congress Has Taken
Steps to Ameliorate.

Congress
recognized that agencies were
over-classifying
information and in 2010, ' sought to decrease classifications and thus

149.

See H.R. REP. No. 111-166, at 327-28 (2009) (noting "concerns remain

regarding the system and its overall impact on DoD employees").
150. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 11184, § 11 13(b)-(c), 123 Stat. 2190, 2498 (2009) (repealing the NSPS).
151. SeeH.R. REP. NO. 111-166, at327-28.
152. 124 CONG. REc. 159, 1727 (1978) (stating the goal of the CSRA was to "serve

the American public while offering necessary protections to the millions of men and
women who dedicate their careers to public service").
153. See S. REP. No. 95-969, at 2-4 (1978) (discussing the need to reform the prior
personnel management system-the Pendleton Act of 1883).
154. Id. at 128.
155.

SeeS. REP. No. 111-200, atl-2(2010).
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156
increase transparency through the Reducing Over-Classification Act.
Further, in 2014, congressional members introduced the Clearance and
Over-Classification Reform and Reduction Act ("CORRECT Act") to
clarify procedures related to security clearances and sensitive
positions.'5 7 The CORRECT Act proposes to help solve the problem of
"over-designations" of sensitive positions. 158 One motivation for
addressing the problem 59of over-designation is to aid the OPM in its
investigatory processes. 1
However, under Conyers, by simply designating positions as
60
noncritical sensitive, agencies can avoid independent MSPB review.
Thus, Conyers hinders Congress's goal of increasing government
transparency by incentivizing agencies to over-designate positions as
noncritical sensitive. 161

4.

The Federal Circuit's Decision Conflicts with the U.S.
Supreme Court's Interpretation of Congressional Intent.

The U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned courts to construe national
security exceptions to employee procedural protections narrowly.162 The
Court determined that Congress sought to protect employees' procedural
rights by limiting agencies' unreviewable dismissal power to the
"minimum scope necessary to [achieve] the purpose of protecting
activities affected with the 'national security."", 163
Accordingly,
Congress should amend the CSRA and reverse the Federal Circuit's
decision because the court's broad reading of the DoD's authority
unnecessarily limits essential procedural protections for civil service
employees that Congress intended to preserve.

156. Reducing Over-Classification Act, Pub. L. No. 111-258, 124 Stat. 2648 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C.).
157. See H.R. 5240, 113th Cong. (2014); S. 2683, 113th Cong. (2014).
158. 160 CONG. REc. 1262 (2014).
159. Id.
160. See infra notes 206-212 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546-47 (1956).
163. Id. at 547 (emphasis added).
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B.

The Federal Circuit Improperly Extended Supreme Court Precedent
by Conflating Sensitive Positions with Those That Require Security
Clearances.
1.

Egan Only Applies to Security Clearances, Which Are
Distinct from a Position's Status as Sensitive.

The Federal Circuit expanded the scope of Egan by improperly
equating sensitive positions and positions in which the occupant has
access to classified information. 164 In Egan, the U.S. Supreme Court
limited MSPB review in a case involving a security clearance because
executive agencies have broad discretion in the "protection of classified
information."'65 The Court never indicated that this broad discretion
would extend to employees who did not have access to classified
information.
"Security clearance" is a term of art historically used to refer to an
employee's access to classified information.166 In fact, the DoD's
Personnel Security Program defines "security clearance" as "a
determination that a person is eligible under the standards of this
Regulation for access to classified information.'', 67 By contrast, a 1953
executive order governs the designation of sensitive positions and
instructs agency heads to designate positions as "sensitive" if the
occupant "could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a
material adverse effect on the national security.' 6 8 In the DoD,
noncritical sensitive positions are classified based on the presence of one
of several characteristics-most of which do not require access to
classified information. 6 9 Accordingly, the terms "noncritical sensitive"
and "classified information" are not synonymous and should not be
treated as such for purposes of MSPB review. 70

164. See Hearings, supra note 1, 113th Cong. at 56:23 (statement of Brian Prioletti,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence) ("There is a difference between the
sensitive position and having a clearance, as we know.").
165. Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (emphasis added).
166. See Conyers v. Dep't of Def., 115 M.S.P.R. 572, 580 (M.S.P.B. 2010), rev'd and
remandedsub nom. Berry v. Conyers, 692 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and reh'g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, 733 F.3 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Jones v. Dep't of the
Navy, 978 F.2d 1223, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Hill v. Dep't of the Air Force, 844 F.2d
1407, 1411 (10th Cir. 1988)).
167. DoD Reg. 5200.2-R § DL1.1.21 (1987) (emphasis added).
168. Exec. Order No. 10,450, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-1953 Comp.); 5 C.F.R. §
732.101 (2013).
169. See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
170. See DoD Reg. 5200.2-R § C3.1.1.
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Other Courts Narrowly Apply Egan.

Courts have applied Egan's national security exception only to
security clearance determinations.' 7' As the U.S. Supreme Court
determined in Egan, offering fewer procedural protections to civil
service employees who have access to classified information is justified
by "reasons ...too obvious to call for enlarged discussion."' 7 2 The
national security justification wanes, however, when an adverse
employment action does not involve the denial or revocation of a
security clearance or access to classified information. 7 3 Specifically,
when the adverse action arises from the denial or revocation of an
employee's access to an agency certification or "approval of the
employee's fitness or other qualifications to hold his position,"' 7 4 the
MSPB has generally held that Egan does not apply to bar merit review of
76
the underlying determination. 75 In Adams v. Department of the Army,1
the MSPB held that, despite Egan, it had authority to review the Army's
decision to revoke an employee's computer access, which provided the
employee access to sensitive information. 177 The MSPB reasoned that
the purpose of Egan was to afford the executive branch the deference

171. See, e.g., Toy v. Holder, 714 F.3d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 650 (2013).
172. Dep't of the Navy. v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471
U.S. 159, 170 (1985)). The U.S. Supreme Court in Egan intended its decision to be
narrowly applied to an agency's "underlying decision to deny or revoke a security
clearance in the course of reviewing an adverse action." Id. at 520 (Blackman, J.)
(emphasis added) (commencing the opinion by so describing the "narrow question"
before the Court).
173. Compare id. at 529-30 (reasoning that the government has a "'compelling
interest' in withholding national security information for unauthorized persons" and thus
agencies have broad discretion to control access to classified information, which justified
decreased due process in determinations on security clearances), with Adams v. Dep't of
the Army, 105 M.S.P.R. 50, 55-56 (M.S.P.B. 2007), aff'd, 273 Fed. Appx. 947 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (holding that revocation of computer access, which contained sensitive
information, was reviewable), and Jacobs v. Dep't of the Army, 62 M.S.P.R. 688, 694-95
(M.S.P.B. 1994) (holding that revocation of an employee's eligibility to access chemical
weapons was reviewable, even when the employee held a security clearance).
174. Adams, 105 M.S.P.R. at 55.
175. See, e.g., id. (revocation of human resource assistant's computer access);
Laycock v. Dep't of the Army, 97 M.S.P.R. 597, 597 (M.S.P.B. 2004) (withdrawal of
attorney-advisor's qualifications approval), affd, 139 F. App'x 270 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Jacobs, 62 M.S.P.R. 688, 695 (disqualification of security guard from Chemical
Personnel Reliability Program); Boulineau v. Dep't of the Army, 57 M.S.P.R. 244, 248
n.6, 249 (M.S.P.B. 1993) (disqualification of helicopter flight instructor from position
based on medical fitness exam); Graham v. Dep't of the Air Force, 46 M.S.P.R. 227, 230
(M.S.P.B. 1990) (termination of medical officer's clinical credentials).
176. Adams v. Dep't of the Army, 105 M.S.P.R. 50, 55-56 (M.S.P.B. 2007), aff'd,
273 Fed. Appx. 947 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
177. Id. at 54-55.
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needed to protect the nation from unauthorized individuals gaining
access to classified information.1 78 The MSPB explained that reviewing
the merits of a security clearance revocation presented national security
concerns that were not present in Adams because the employee did not
have access to classified information
or access to information that would
79
require a security clearance.1
Similarly, other U.S. Courts of Appeals have limited Egan to the
domain of classified information.' 80 Courts have held, for example, that
Egan does not apply to prohibit review of the revocation of agency
certifications. 18 1 Despite other circuits' limiting of Egan to security
clearances, the Federal Circuit has
the final say because it holds
82
exclusive power to bind the MSPB. 1
Congress should amend the CSRA to effectively overrule the
Federal Circuit because courts have consistently applied Egan only to
security clearance revocations or denials. 83 Without Congressional
action, the Federal Circuit's decision will be final even though other
circuits have refused to extend Egan.l8 4 Further, because sensitive
positions and security clearances are not synonymous, the85Federal Circuit
should not have extended Egan beyond its limited reach.1
3.

The Federal Circuit Misapplied the Compilation Theory.

The Federal Circuit in Conyers contended that Northover and
Conyers could be terminated without MSPB review even though their
positions did not require security clearances because the employees
178.

Id. at 55 (citing Egan, 484 U.S. at 529).

179. Id. at 55; accordJacobs, 62 M.S.P.R. at 695 (reasoning that "[a]s the protector
of the government's merit systems, the [MSPB] is not eager to expand the scope of the
rationale in Egan to divest federal employees whose positions do not require a security
clearance of basic protections against non-meritorious agency actions").
180. See Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1167-68 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014) (Dyk, J., dissenting); Toy v. Holder, 714 F.3d 881, 885 (5th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 650 (2013) ("No court has extended Egan beyond security
clearances, and we decline to do so.").
181. See, e.g., Toy, 714 F.3d at 884-86 (stating that revocation of Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) contract employee's building access is not within the purview of
Egan's exception to MSPB review); Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764, 770 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (stating that FBI officials' decision to report employee as security concern is not
within Egan's exception to MSPB review). An "agency certification" is an agency's
approval that an employee is authorized or qualified to hold a specific position or perform
certain tasks. See, e.g., Adams, 105 M.S.P.R. at 55.
182. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24-25, Kaplan v. Conyers, No. 2011-3207,
2013 WL 4417583 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 2013), petition for cert.filed sub nom. Northover
v. Archuleta, No. 13-607 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2013) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b) (2012)).
183. See, e.g., Toy, 714 F.3d at 884-86.
184. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 165-169 and accompanying text.
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could potentially ascertain classified security information. 186 In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied on the "compilation theory," which
supposes that pieces of otherwise unclassified information, taken
together, can become classifiable when they have the potential to reveal
classified information.1 7 The compilation theory is borne out of an
executive order that provides authority and
guidance to agency heads in
88
information
security
national
classifying
The Federal Circuit's reliance on the compilation theory is flawed
for three reasons. First, the compilation theory serves to justify an
agency's decision to classify certain information. 89 The employees in
Conyers had no access to classified information, and offering theories of
how information relating to their position may be classified is
immaterial.' 90 The theory does not, as the court suggests, provide a post
hoc justification for limiting removal procedures.
Second, in support of its point, the Federal Circuit cited two cases in
which courts refused to grant the adverse parties' litigation requests that
the government release information classified per the compilation
theory. 19 In stark contrast, the employees in Conyers are not seeking
disclosure of any information that is potentially classifiable under the
compilation theory. 192 Rather, the employees were seeking to discuss,
through MSPB review, their demotion and termination from stocking and
secretarial positions due to debt they held. 193 While several courts have
invoked the compilation theory to deprive parties of the ability to
discover information, 194 no other court has invoked it to prohibit an
employee from divulging to a court any information related to his job,
such as what type of shampoo he placed on the shelves. 195 To the
contrary, courts have routinely reviewed the merits of denials based on

186. Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1759 (2014).
187. See id at 1158-60 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7(e), 3 C.F.R. 298, 1.7(e)
(2009), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 435 (Supp. V 2012)).
188. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7(e), 3 C.F.R. 298, 1.7(e) (2009), reprinted in
50 U.S.C. § 435 (Supp. V 2012).
189. See, e.g., Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 551 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).
190. See Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1153; see also Stipulation, supra note 93.
191. Kiareldeen, 273 F.3d at 551 n.2 (holding that in a deportation appeal, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's production of unclassified summaries, rather
than the documents themselves, was justified by the compilation theory); Kasza v.
Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Air Force properly
asserted the compilation theory to withhold documents requested in discovery).
192. See Stipulation, supra note 93.
193. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner at 11, Berry v. Conyers, 692 F.3d 1223 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (No. 2011-3207), 2011 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs 3207.
194. See, e.g., Kiareldeen, 273 F.3d at 551 n.2.
195. See Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1163 n.15.
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agency-held certifications or other suitability
determinations when they
196
do not involve security clearance denials.
Third, as a policy consideration, the compilation theory has
potential for abuse, and courts only rarely reject the Government's
compilation defense. 197 Although the figure is unknown, some scholars
estimate that 75 percent of government-held information is classified
pursuant to the compilation theory. 198 Here, no such information is
sought. Because the compilation theory does not apply in the context of
Conyers, and because it would strip all sensitive employees of CSRA
protections, the Federal Circuit should not have applied the theory as a
basis for precluding MSPB review.
4.

The Supreme Court Has Weighed In and Determined That
National Security Concerns Arise from Those with Access to
Classified Information.

In Cole v. Young,1 99 the U.S. Supreme Court supported a narrow
definition of "national security" when used to bypass employees'
procedural protections, analogous to the ones prescribed in the CSRA.2 °°
In Cole, the Court held that only in positions that provide a risk of
"immediate threat of harm" to national security should an employee's
procedural protections be limited through the use of an agency's
unreviewable dismissal power."' The Court explained that national
security concerns are only directly implicated when an employee in a
sensitive position posed a "security risk"-a risk caused by "employees
having access to classified materials."2 °2 The Court thus equated
sensitive positions with positions that had access to classified
information and, accordingly, limited agencies' unreviewable removal

196. See supra Part 1II.B.2.
197. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the
Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 665, 679 (2005) (explaining that courts
are overly deferential to compilation theory claims and uphold highly speculative claims
that lack "any legitimate analytic basis").
198. Id. at 648.
199. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
200. See id. at 543 (defining the scope of agencies' unreviewable dismissal powers
under the Act of August 26, 1950 ("Act") when "deemed necessary 'in the interest of the
national security'). Cole defined "national security" within the meaning of the Act,
which was a precursor to 5 U.S.C. § 7532 (2012). See Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1158 n.10.
Cole, which preceded the passage of the CSRA, interpreted the Act's application to the
Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 that similarly gave civil service employees the right to
appeal adverse employment actions. See id.
201. Cole, 351 U.S. at543, 46.
202. Id. at 550.
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power to only those instances when an employee has access to classified
or top-secret material.2 °3
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that national
20 4
security risks arise from those with access to classified information
and that unreviewable dismissal power is narrowly permitted, the Federal
Circuit's decision allowing summary dismissal of a grocery store clerk
should be reversed.
C.

The Extension of Egan Adversely Affects Numerous Individuals.
1.

Conyers Creates a "Sensitive Jobs" Loophole.

Within the DoD alone, at least 200,000 employees occupy
noncritical sensitive positions. 2°" Agencies also have complete discretion
in classifying positions as sensitive.20 6 In fact, there is currently no
public guidance on an agency's designation process.20 7 Moreover, bases
for finding an employee ineligible are vast and include any scenario in
which the employee may "compromise sensitive information. ' 20 8 In
Conyers, for example, the employees were denied eligibility to hold
noncritical sensitive positions because they held debt due to death or
divorce.20 9

203. Id. at 550-51. Further, the Court found that the position was improperly
classified as sensitive because the employee lacked access to classified information and
"was not in a position to influence policy against the interests of the Government." Id.at
556-57 n.19.
204. See Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (citing Cole for the
proposition that the agency head, who is responsible for safeguarding classified
information, should have final discretion in determining who has access to such
information, and the decision, therefore, should bypass independent review).
205. Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1178.
206. See Exec. Order No. 10,450, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-1953 Comp.); 5 C.F.R. §
732.201(a) (2013); Skees v. Dep't of the Navy, 864 F.2d 1576, 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
207. See Hearings,supra note 1, at 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of Timothy F.
Curry, Deputy Assoc. Dir. for Partnership & Labor Relations at the OPM). A proposed
regulation to "facilitate more uniform and consistent designations which are more closely
aligned with the actual national security implications and sensitivities attending the
position" indicates that the lack of guidance is a problem for agencies. Id. at 113th Cong.
4 (2013) (statement of Brian Prioletti, Office of the Director of National Intelligence); see
Designation of National Security Positions in the Competitive Service, and Related
Matters, 78 Fed. Reg. 31847 (proposed May 28, 2013) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt.
732).
208. Egan, 484 U.S. at 528 (discussing an agency's decision to grant a security
clearance); see Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1164-65 ("Occasionally, those means of obtention
For example, the intelligence
[of intelligence] are coercive and/or subversive.
community may view certain disparaging information concerning an employee as a
vulnerability which can be used to blackmail or coerce information out of the
individual.").
209. See Davidson, supra note 90.
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Herein arises the fear of a "sensitive jobs" loophole through which
agencies can easily engage in arbitrary adverse personnel actions upon
routine background checks. 210 Agencies can easily and without oversight
classify positions as sensitive. 211 The loophole thus allows agencies to
designate employees as occupying sensitive jobs to avoid
congressionally mandated CSRA personnel procedures.212 Agency heads
are incentivized to classify positions as sensitive because it serves their
interest to have more control over employment decisions. 1 3 Personnel
decisions based on criteria other than merit, however, are exactly what
the CSRA was intended to curb.214 And although it is hard to imagine
that agencies would abuse this power, such abuse was the impetus for the
CSRA in 1978.215 Many critics, therefore, predict a surge in sensitive
designations due to the Conyers decision, leaving employees with no
recourse from adverse personnel actions.216 Accordingly, the loophole
should be closed because it threatens
to undermine the accountability
217
policy objectives of the CSRA.

210. See, e.g., Corrected Brief for Amicus Curiae Government Accountability Project
in Support of Respondents in Favor of Affirming the Board's Decision, Kaplan v.
Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 2011-3207), 2013 WL 1637206; 159
CONG. REC. E1457 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2013) (statement of Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton)
(stating that "[m]y bill would stop the use of 'national security' to repeal a vital
component of civil service protection and of due process" in reference to H.R. 3278,
113th Cong. (as introduced Nov. 8, 2013)).
211. See Skees v. Dep't of the Navy, 864 F.2d 1576, 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
212. See, e.g., Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1178-80 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority's decision will have "profound consequences" affecting as many as 200,000
noncritical sensitive civilians employed in the DoD who do not have, or require, access to
classified information); 159 CONG. REc. E1457 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2013) (statement of
Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton) (warning that the decision will create "avenues for
unreviewable, arbitrary action or retaliation by an agency head and, in addition, makes a
mockery of whistleblower protections" and will result in stripping employees of due
process under the pretext of national security).
213. See Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1178-79 (citing dozens of cases pending on appeal
until Conyers is decided).
214. See supra Part III.A.3.
215. See supra Part IlI.A.3.
216. See, e.g., Jack Moore, Court Ruling Gives Agencies 'Weapon' Against
Employees, Union Says, FEDERAL NEWS RADIO (Aug. 28, 2013, 11:58 AM),
http://bit.ly/leXkjaU; Press Release, Angela Canterbury, Dir. of Pub. Policy of the
Project on Gov't Oversight, Activist Court Decision Strips Civil Service Rights and
Whistleblower Protections From National Security Positions (Aug. 21, 2013), available
at http://bit.ly/ly0Q6xb.
217. See Press Release, Angela Canterbury, supranote 216.
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Whistleblower

A primary purpose of the CSRA is to protect employees who report
actions of "mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety"-or blow the whistle.2 I8 However, in response to insufficient
protections in the CSRA, Congress enacted the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012219 ("WPEA") to encourage more employees to
blow the whistle.22 ° Specifically, Congress granted the MSPB more
authority to adjudicate claims of whistleblower retaliation. 22' Congress
has fought for whistleblower protections because it has recognized that
encouraging whistleblowing helps achieve an efficient workforce and
However, whistleblowers are in
increased government accountability.
need of strong protection because employers often retaliate against the
disclosing employees with adverse personnel actions.223 In this sense,
whistleblowers act as an added enforc-ment mechanism of the merit
system principles.22 4
The sensitive jobs loophole is damaging to whistleblowers because
it prevents the MSPB from adjudicating a sensitive employee's claim of
retaliatory firing for blowing the whistle on a supervisor.225 Courts have
held that when an employee asserts that her removal based on her
security clearance revocation was pretextual, the MSPB cannot
adjudicate the employee's claim because it would need to review the
merits of the security clearance denial, which Egan prohibits.22 6
Assimilating Conyers, the same logic would bar MSPB review over
employees in sensitive jobs who allege whistleblower retaliation. 227 The
loophole aggravates whistleblowers' already shaky protection by the

218.

5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2012); see also Wren v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 681 F.2d 867,

872 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
219. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126
Stat. 1465 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
220. See S. REP. No. 112-155, at 3 (2012).
221. See id. at 4.
222. See S. REP. No. 95-969, at 1-2 (1978).
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. See Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1180, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1759
(2014) (Dyk, J., dissenting).
226. See id. (citing Bennet v. Chertoff, 425 F.3d 999, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hesse v.
Dep't of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1377-80 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
227. Id.
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Federal Circuit and the MSPB, which have22reputations
for lackluster
8
enforcement of whistleblower protection laws.
Congress sought to promote whistleblowing even in the realm of
national security to curtail unproductive and dangerous activities. 229
However, under Conyers, employees cannot rely on the WPEA to protect
themselves from lawful disclosures of waste or mismanagement because
they can be summarily fired under the guise of eligibility
determinations.2 30 The fear of retaliation discourages whistleblowers
from reporting fraud, abuse, and waste, thereby fostering an inefficient
personnel management system contrary to Congress's clear intent to
encourage whistleblowing. 231 Because the MSPB protects against
disclosure of classified information,232 Congress should foreclose the
unnecessary sensitive jobs loophole.
IV. CONCLUSION

The events of September 11, 2001 sparked a surge in aggressive
security measures within the United States government.
Today,
considerably more governmental positions require security clearances. 23
In 2012, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that
more than 4.9 million government employees held a security
clearance.234 Under Egan, all 4.9 million employees are denied review
by an independent, bipartisan board of the merits of any adverse personal
actions based on a determination of their security clearance. 235 In
Conyers, the Federal Circuit added hundreds of thousands more federal
employees to the list of those deprived of access to the MSPB.236 In
228. See S. REP. No. 112-155, at 4, 18 (2012) (blaming the Federal Circuit and the
MSPB for substantially limiting whistleblower protections and doing so inconsistently
with congressional intent); Lilyanne Ohanesian, Protecting Uncle Sam 's Whistleblowers:
All-Circuit Review of WPA Appeals, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 615, 616-17 (2012) (stating that
since the Whistleblower Protection Act ("WPA") was amended in 1994, the MSPB had
dismissed half of all WPA claims, and the Federal Circuit decided for the whistleblower
in only three out of 229 WPA appeals). The WPEA strengthened protections offered
under the WPA, which offers a procedural framework through which whistleblowers can
appeal adverse personnel actions. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L.
103-424, 108 Stat. 4361 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.);
S. REP. No. 112-155, at 4.
229. See S. REP. No. 112-155, at 22, 24-25; S. REP. No. 95-969, at 6.
230. See, e.g., Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1180 (Dyk, J. dissenting).
231. SeeS. REP. No. 112-155, at3.
232. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
233. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 8.
234.

OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,

2012 REPORT ON SECURITY

CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS 3 (2013), available at http://bit.ly/IcFDv7m.

235. See Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988).
236. See Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1160 (Fed Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 1759 (2014).
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addition, agencies often haphazardly designate positions that are
nonsensitive as sensitive. 237
When the U.S. Supreme Court rightfully established a national
security exception to the CSRA's procedures for aggrieved employees,
the Court limited this exception to those with access to classified
information.23 8 The Federal Circuit encroached on the CSRA and other
courts when it concluded that the national security exception should be
expanded to include employees who occupy positions classified as
noncritical sensitive, regardless of the positions' actual effect on national
39
security.1

Consequently, Congress should amend the CSRA to reverse
Conyers and refuse to inflate the Egan national security exception
beyond security clearances. Enabling the MSPB to adjudicate the merits
of an adverse action based on an eligibility determination regarding
sensitive positions will preserve the merit system principles set forth in
the CSRA. 240
Furthermore, foreclosing the exception will rescue
hundreds of thousands of employees from the sensitive jobs loophole
and
24
will foster an efficient workforce by encouraging whistleblowing.

237. See supra notes 206, 210-212 and accompanying text.
238.

See Egan, 484 U.S. at 530.

239. See Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1160.
240.
241.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.C.

